Introduction
Goodman's theorem states that intuitionistic finite-type arithmetic HA ω plus the axiom of choice AC plus the axiom of (relativized) dependent choice RDC is conservative over HA. This result does not extend to the classical case. In fact, adding classical logic leads to a system as strong as full second-order arithmetic. On the other hand, the same result does not apply to subsystems of HA ω with restricted induction [7] . The original proof of this theorem is due to Goodman [5] and is based on his arithmetic theory of constructions. A direct proof appears in Goodman [6] and relies on a realizability notion which blends together the model HRO of the hereditarily recursive operations, Kleene recursive realizability, and Kripke semantics. A restyling of Goodman's proof can be found in Beeson [1] , where Goodman realizability [6] splits into a realizability part and a forcing part.
The same framework appears in other papers on Goodman's theorem [3, 4] .
In this paper we introduce a customized version of Goodman realizability and give a new proof of the extensional case, that is, we show that E-HA ω +AC+DC is conservative over HA. The only known proof of this result is also due to Beeson [1] ( 1 ). Beeson [1, page 9] points out that if we combine Kreisel's modified realizability with the model HEO of the hereditarily effective operations then we obtain a realizability interpretation of E-HA ω + AC into HA but we cannot force first-order formulas to be self-realizing. The problem is that in Kreisel's modified realizability the realizers are total object. Beeson's solution is to consider a version of Kreisel's modified realizability for finite-type partial functionals. We propose a different solution ( 2 ). We follow Goodman's blueprint and define a realizability notion which combines the model HEO of the hereditarily effective operations with an extensional version of Kleene recursive realizability. Indeed, we define an extensional equality between realizers of a formula ϕ, denoted p (a, b) : ϕ, where a and b are natural numbers and p is a partial function from natural numbers to natural numbers, whose intended meaning is 'p forces a and b to be equal realizers of ϕ'. By letting p a : ϕ be a shorthand for p (a, a) : ϕ, we therefore prove:
• Soundness: for every sentence ϕ provable in E-HA ω + AC + DC there exists an index a such that for every definable set T of partial functions HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T (p a : ϕ) • Self-realizability: for every first-order sentence ϕ there exists a non-empty definable set T of finite partial functions such that HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T ∀a ((p a : ϕ) → ϕ).
Goodman writes p, a ϕ. Our choice of notation p a : ϕ arises from viewing ϕ as a type, the type of its realizers. It is worth noticing that the indices in the proofs of both the soundness and the self-realizability theorems are exactly the ones in [6, Theorems 1 and 4] . The verification is straightforward, although burdensome.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the system E-HA ω + AC + DC. In Section 3 we review Goodman realizability. In Section 4 we present our version of Goodman realizability and prove the extensional case. Finally, we show in Section 5 how to combine the model HEO with Kleene recursive realizability to obtain a realizability interpretation of E-HA ω + AC + DC into HA, where the realizers are, as in Kreisel's modified realizability, total objects. Actually, one can define a Goodman version of this interpretation and prove its soundness in HA. What fails in HA, but not in PA, is the self-realizability theorem, which makes this approach unsuitable to prove the conservativity of E-HA ω + AC + DC over HA. We discuss this further at the end of Section 5.
Extensional finite-type arithmetic with choice
We assume familiarity with systems of arithmetic in all finite types (see, e.g., [8, 9] ). Here, we formalize E-HA ω + AC + DC following Goodman [6] . In particular, we have equality at every finite type. We denote types by A, B, C, . . . N denotes the type of natural numbers. As in Goodman, we also have product types A × B.
The language L of finite-type arithmetic includes variables at all sensible types, the constant 0 of type N , the constant S for successor of type N → N , functions symbols for all primitive recursive functions, constants for combinators Π, Σ, recursors R, pairing D and projections D 0 , D 1 at all sensible types.
Terms ::= variables | constants | f (α 1 , . . . , α k ) | αβ
Here, f is a function symbol for a primitive recursive function and α i are terms of type N . In the application term αβ, α is a term of type A → B and β is a term of type A. To be precise, for all types A and B, we have a binary function symbol Ap of sort (A → B) × A → B . Therefore, αβ stands for Ap(α, β) ( 3 ). We usually indicate the type of a term by a superscript as in α A . For every type A we have a binary relation symbol = A for equality of type A.
2 Actually, our attempt to follow Beeson's strategy turned out to be amiss. The problem is the soundness. To make a long story short, partial functionals with extensional equality only with respect to total functionals do not behave well. 3 Note that we are dealing with a many-sorted first-order theory. The types are indeed the sorts of the language.
Here, α and β are terms of type A. As usual in systems of arithmetic, we write ¬ϕ as an abbreviation for ϕ → 0 = S0.
Axioms and rules:
Propositional logic: (1) ϕ → ϕ (2) Modus ponens: if ϕ and ϕ → ψ then ψ (3) Syllogism: if ϕ → ψ and ψ → χ then ϕ → χ (4) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ (5) ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ, ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ (6) If χ → ϕ and χ → ψ then χ → ϕ ∧ ψ (7) If ϕ → χ and ψ → χ then ϕ ∨ ψ → χ (8) ϕ ∧ ψ → χ iff ϕ → (ψ → χ) (9) 0 = S0 → ϕ Predicate logic: (10) If ϕ → ψ then ϕ → ∀xψ, for x not free in ϕ (11) If ϕ → ψ then ∃xϕ → ψ, for x not free in ψ (12) ∀xϕ → ϕ(α), ϕ(α) → ∃xϕ, for any term α free for x in ϕ Axioms for constants: (13) ¬(0 = Sx), Sx = Sy → x = y, for x, y variables of type N (14) Defining equations of primitive recursive functions (15) Combinators: Πxy = x and Σxyz = (xz)(yz) at all sensible types (16) Recursors: Rxy0 = x and Rxy(Sz) = y(Rxyz)z at all sensible types (17) D 0 (Dxy) = x and D 1 (Dxy) = y, for x of type A and y of type B (18) x = D(D 0 x)(D 1 x), for x of type A × B Induction: (19) If ϕ(0) and ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx) then ϕ(x), for x variable of type N Equality: (20) x = x, for x of type A (21) x = y ∨ ¬(x = y), for x and y of type N (22) Leibniz: x = y ∧ ϕ(x) → ϕ(y), for x and y of type A Extensionality: (23) ∀z(xz = yz) → x = y, for z of type A and x, y of type A → B Axiom of choice: (24) ∀x∃yϕ(x, y) → ∃z∀xϕ(x, zx), for x of type A, y of type B, and z of type A → B Axiom of relativized dependent choice:
, for x and y of type A, z of type N → A and v of type N .
E-HA ω is the system (1)-(23). Indeed, axiom ¬(0 = Sx) in (13) and axiom (21) are provable from the other axioms. Similarly, the axioms (14) are redundant (combinators and recursors enable us to define every primitive recursive function). The reason to include them is to see HA as a subsystem of E-HA ω (once we identify the function symbol S and the type N → N constant S). Indeed, let us define HA to be the restriction of E-HA ω to first-order formulas. By a first-order (arithmetical) formula we mean a formula of L which contains only first-order terms and quantifiers of type N , where a first-order term α is defined as follows:
In particular, in HA we do not have axioms (15)-(18) and (23)-(24).
Goodman [6] defines HA ω without (axioms for) combinators and recursors. On the other hand, Goodman has decidable equality at every type, that is, axiom (21) holds with no restriction. Goodman's formulation of HA ω is thus different from other versions present in the literature. Our version of E-HA ω has equality at all types and is equivalent to a conservative extension of Kohlenbach's E-HA ω [8] (Kohlenbach's system does not have product types). Note that the restriction of axiom (21) to type N is necessary, for otherwise we would have excluded middle for all formulas (by proving that for every formula ϕ with free variables x 1 , . . . , x k there exist closed terms α and β such that ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) ↔ αx 1 . . . x k = A βx 1 . . . x k , where the type A depends on ϕ).
2.1. Notation. As usual, we denote byn the numeral corresponding to the natural number n. We omit the overline notation when clear from context. Kleene application. Let {a}(n) be Kleene bracket application. As usual, we think of a as a code for a partial recursive function from N to N. Similarly, let {a} p (n) be Kleene bracket application relative to the oracle p. Throughout the paper p is a partial function from N to N. To further ease notation, we write, e.g., ab for {a}(b) and a p b for {a} p (b). More in general, we write an 1 . . . n k for (an 1 . . . n k−1 )n k . Similarly for a p n 1 . . . n k . For instance, a p bc stands for (a p b) p c. We might write a p (b, c) in the interest of readability.
We tacitly assume the s-m-n theorem and the recursion theorem in HA ( 4 ). Kleene equality. Write an = bm if an and bm are both defined and equal. Write an ≃ bm iff either an and bm are both undefined or else an = bm.
By Λn.f (n) we denote a canonical index for the partial recursive function f . In general,
Types. To save on parentheses we agree that × binds stronger that →. Thus A × B → C stands for (A × B) → C. We use association to the right. Let
By x 1 , . . . , x k we denote a list of k variables. Similarly, by n 1 , . . . , n k we denote a list of k natural numbers. This includes the empty list. Say for k = 0.
Tuples. Let ·, · be any primitive recursive bijection from pairs of natural numbers to natural numbers with primitive recursive projections (·) 0 and (·) 1 . Let n 1 , . . . , n k be n 1 , n 1 , . . . , n k . Note that a natural number n codes a tuple of length k for any given k. To ease notation, we assume a primitive recursive coding of sequences of natural numbers with primitive recursive projections (·) i for any natural number i. We thus identify the tuple n 1 , . . . , n k with the corresponding sequence of length k and write (n) i for the i-th component of the sequence. For example, if n = n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , we write (n) 2 for n 2 instead of ((n) 1 ) 0 .
Goodman realizability: review
We review Goodman realizability [6] for HA ω + AC + DC. Note that the formalization of HRO in HA gives an interpretation |ϕ| of HA ω into HA. In particular, for every sentence ϕ provable in HA ω there exists a number a such that HA ⊢ a realizes |ϕ|, where a realizes ϕ is Kleene recursive realizability ( 5 ). Therefore:
Since |AC| and |DC| are Kleene realizable, provably in HA, we have that:
4 s-m-n theorem: For all standard m, n there is a primitive recursive function s such that HA proves {a}(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) ≃ {s(a, x1, . . . , xn)}(y1, . . . , ym).
Recursion theorem: HA proves that for all a, n there is e such that {a}(e, x1, . . . , xn) ≃ {e}(x1, . . . , xn).
5 Actually we should write HA ⊢ā realizes ϕ. We omit such subtleties.
− −−−−−−−− → HA ⊢ a realizes |ϕ| Goodman's realizability bundles together the above interpretations and combines them with a Kripke forcing relation. Let us see some details.
Let T be a set of partial functions from natural numbers to natural numbers. We define p a : ϕ, where p ∈ T , a is a number and ϕ is a formula of L. We tacitly quantify p, q, r over T . Warning: the discussion is informal. See for instance Kleene recursive realizability vs its formalized version in HA. Note that in HA we cannot even talk about arbitrary partial functions. At the end of the section we state the formalized versions from which Goodman's theorem follows.
(1) First, one defines p a ∈ A, where a is a number, p ∈ T and A is a type. We only mention the clause for the arrow type.
• p a ∈ A → B if for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q n ∈ A, there exists r ⊇ q such that a r n is defined and r a r n ∈ B. This is a (relativized) version of HRO. The forcing relation is monotone: if p a ∈ A and q ⊇ p then q a ∈ A.
(2) Second, for any p ∈ T , let L p be the language L of HA ω augmented with constants F A a of type A, for every number a and every type A such that p a ∈ A. Note that L p ⊆ L q if p ⊆ q. Then one defines the interpretation (value) |α| p of a closed term α of L p . This can be undefined. We only mention the clause for an application term αβ.
• |αβ| p ≃ {|α| p } p (|β| p ) The value is monotone, that is, if p ⊆ q and |α| p is defined, then |α| q is defined and |α| p = |α| q .
(3) Goodman realizability. Finally, one defines p a : ϕ, where p ∈ T , a is a number, and ϕ is a sentence of L p .
• p a : α = β iff |α| p and |β| p are both defined and |α| p = |β| p • p a : ϕ ∧ ψ iff p (a) 0 : ϕ and p (a) 1 : ψ • p a : ϕ ∨ ψ iff (a) 0 = 0 and p (a) 1 : ϕ or else (a) 0 = 1 and p (a) 1 : ψ • p a : ϕ → ψ if for every q ⊇ p and for every number b such that q b : ϕ, there exists r ⊇ q such that a r b is defined and r a r b :
• p a : ∀x A ϕ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q n ∈ A, there exists r ⊇ q such that a r n is defined and r a r n : ϕ(F A n ) Theorem 3.1 (Soundness of Goodman realizability, cf. [6, Theorem 1] • if ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ) is true, then for every p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p such that a q n 1 . . . n k is defined and q a q n 1 . . . n k : ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ).
In particular, if ϕ is a first-order sentence of L, then there exists a nonempty set T of finite partial functions such that:
• if ϕ is true, then for every p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p and a number a such that q a : ϕ
In the self-realizability theorem we agree on letting a p be, say, a p 0 if the list x 1 , . . . , x k is empty. Alternatively, read a p n 1 . . . n k as a p 0n 1 . . . n k .
Goodman's theorem follows by formalizing the above proofs in HA. A set T of finite partial functions is definable in HA if there exists a formula ψ(x) of HA such that for any finite partial function p, p ∈ T iff ψ(p) is true. Here, we assume some fixed encoding of finite partial functions with natural numbers. 
3.1. Remarks. 1. For T = {p}, we have p a ∈ A iff a ∈ H A p , where
A type} is the model of hereditarily recursive operations relative to p. In particular, |α| p is the interpretation of α in HRO p .
2. For T = {p}, Goodman realizability is essentially the HRO interpretation of HA ω into HA followed by Kleene recursive realizability relative to p.
3. The statement of [6, Theorem 1] is slightly different. Besides, it follows from the proof that we can actually choose a in advance, that is, the index a does not depend on T but only on the proof of ϕ. See our Theorem 4.1.
4. The statement of [6, Theorem 4] is quite different from Theorem 3.2. Moreover, Goodman's argument involves a rather complicated induction on the formula ϕ. A more straightforward argument is as in the proof of [1, Lemma 4.1] . See also our proof of Theorem 4.2.
5. Goodman [6, Theorem 5] states that for every provable sentence ϕ and for every definable set T of finite partial functions there is an index a such that
This is enough to prove Goodman's theorem. That our version of the soundness theorem holds follows from the proof.
6. Goodman [6, Theorem 6] states that if ϕ is a first-order sentence of HA ω , then there exists a definable nonempty set T of finite partial functions and an index a such that
However, this does not work in HA. In fact, suppose ϕ is a sentence of the form ψ 0 ∨ ψ 1 . Then we should be able to find an index a such that if ϕ is true then for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that q a : ϕ. Following the proof, we have an index a i for ψ i and a should be either 0, a 0 or 1, a 1 . Of course we can choose neither beforehand.
7. If we define Goodman realizability by replacing the clauses for → and ∀ with the following:
• p a : ϕ → ψ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number b such that q b : ϕ, a q b is defined and q a q b : ψ • p a : ∀x A ϕ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q n ∈ A, a q n is defined and q a q n : ϕ(F A n ) then we can still prove the soundness theorem but we are no longer able to prove the self-realizability theorem. This is where the ∀p∃q ⊇ p definition is at work.
8. It clearly follows from Goodman's theorem that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ of HA ω , if HA ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ, then PA ⊢ ϕ. Indeed, the proof of this weaker conservation result can be obtained by using total functions instead of finite partial functions. Let ACA 0 be the subsystem of second order-arithmetic with comprehension and induction restricted to arithmetical formulas. It is well-known that ACA 0 is conservative over PA. One can show that if T is a set of total functions p from N to N definable in the language of second-order arithmetic, and ϕ is a provable sentence of HA ω + AC + DC, then there is an index a such that
Fix a first-order sentence ϕ and let T be the set of total functions from N to N which are Skolem functions for every subformula of ϕ. Then T is definable and one can show that
In fact, we can define a p in T by arithmetical comprehension. By putting the things together, we have that if HA ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ, then ACA 0 ⊢ ϕ, and so PA ⊢ ϕ, for any arithmetical sentence ϕ.
Of course one needs to reprove the soundness and the self-realizability theorems and so this is not a real simplification. However, note that we can work with total functions. Goodman's proof is designed for HA and to obtain the conservation result one must use partial functions so that HA ⊢ ∃p p ∈ T . For instance we always have ∅ ∈ T . With total functions the definition of Goodman realizability is much simpler. Basically, p a : ϕ iff a Kleene realizes ϕ relative to p. For instance,
• p a : ϕ → ψ iff for every b, if p b : ϕ then a p b is defined and p a p b : ψ. In particular, the definition of p a : ϕ is local, that is, it does not depend on other q ∈ T .
3.2. Discussion. One might wonder how Goodman's theorem applies to concrete proofs in, say, HA ω + AC of a first-order sentence ϕ. How does the corresponding proof in HA look like? For instance, it is not difficult to see that there is a proof in HA ω + AC of the collection principle ∀x < a∃yϕ(x, y) → ∃b∀x < a∃y < bϕ(x, y), where ϕ(x, y) is any first-order formula, that uses only quantifier-free induction and countable choice ( 6 ). In the proof of the soundness theorem no induction is used to realize AC. However, the induction needed to realize quantifier-free induction depends on the complexity of the forcing conditions, which in this case depends on the complexity of ϕ(x, y). In other words, the amount of induction needed in the proof of collection in HA depends on the complexity of ϕ(x, y).
It would be interesting to find a more direct proof of Goodman's conservation result that can be easily implemented so as to give a direct transformation of proofs in HA ω + AC into proofs in HA. Goodman's proof is not quite suitable for this purpose.
Goodman's theorem for choice and extensionality
We aim to define a tailored version of Goodman realizability for both choice and extensionality such that first-order formulas are self-realizing. As observed in Section 3, Goodman realizability is essentially the HRO interpretation of HA ω into HA followed by Kleene recursive realizability. Note that the HRO interpretation of extensionality is not Kleene realizable (otherwise extensionality 6 From ∀x < a∃yϕ(x, y) obtain ∃f ∀x < aϕ(x, f x) by countable choice. Then take b = 1 + max{f x|x < a} so that we have ∀x < a∃y < bϕ(x, y).
would hold in HRO). Therefore Goodman realizability does not validate extensionality. Before presenting our version of Goodman realizability, let us discuss some attempts to solve the problem. Let us focus on the soundness. In fact, adding the forcing relation, although crucial for the selfrealizability theorem, is a routine matter.
1. The most obvious attempt is to replace HRO with HEO. This would validate extensionality. The problem is that the HEO interpretation of AC is not Kleene realizable. For instance, (the interpretation of)
is Kleene realizable (any index for the identity function will do) but (the interpretation of)
is not. Therefore, the following instance of the axiom of choice
is not Kleene realizable. 2. A second attempt is to consider Kreisel's modified realizability followed by the HEO interpretation of E-HA ω into HA. That this cannot work follows from the fact that in Kreisel's modified realizability certain instances of independence of premise which are not provable in HA are nevertheless realizable. This is definitely a problem.
3. To avoid the problem in 2. one can first interpret E-HA ω into HA by using HEO and then reinterpret HA into itself by using a Kreisel's version of Kleene recursive realizability. Note in fact that independence of premise is not Kleene realizable. A direct realizability interpretation of E-HA ω + AC + DC into HA based on this idea can be found in Section 5. In this interpretation formulas ϕ come with a certain type A and realizers of ϕ are objects of HEO of type A. By adding the forcing relation we obtain a realizability interpretation which is sound but fails to satisfy the self-realizability theorem. This is the problem described in the introduction.
So much for the attempts. Our solution is to combine HEO with an extensional version of Kleene realizability. In a sense, the interpretation in 3. is also extensional since realizers are elements of HEO. This is not the case here. We use HEO to interpret the quantifiers ∃x A and ∀x A , but we do not see realizers as elements of HEO. Actually, every formula is a type, the type of its realizers, and we have an extensional equality between realizers of the same formula. The link is the following:
. This is what we need to realize AC. On the other hand, extensionality is trivially realizable since it follows from its HEO interpretation. Details follow.
We will repeatedly use the fact that p ⊆ q implies a p ⊆ a q , that is, for all n, if a p n is defined, then a q n is also defined and a p n = a q n. Let T be any set of partial functions from N to N. From now on, we tacitly quantify p, q, r over T . As in Goodman, our discussion is informal. The reader will convince himself that all the definitions and proofs can be carried out in HA.
Convention. For the sake of brevity we write, e.g., p abc ∈ A for a p bc is defined and p a p bc ∈ A. Similarly, we write, e.g., p (an, b) : ϕ(F cm ) for a p n and c p m are defined and p (a p n, b) : ϕ(F c p m ).
(1) For every p ∈ T , for all numbers a, b and for every type A, we define p a = A b and let p a ∈ A be p a = A a.
• (2) For any p ∈ T , let L p be the language L of HA ω augmented with constants F A a for any a and A such that p a ∈ A. We simply write F a when the type is clear from the context. In particular, a term of L is a term of L p for all p. Note that if α is a term of L p (we also say that α is a p-term) and q ⊇ p, then α is a q-term. The value |α| p of a closed term α of L p is defined as in Goodman by recursion on A. Note that |α| p can be undefined.
• |0| p = 0
• |F A a | p = a |R| exists by the recursion theorem. Properties. (V1) Monotonicity. If |α| p is defined and q ⊇ p then |α| q is defined and |α| p = |α| q . (V2) For any term α with variables among the distinct variables
Convention. For the sake of brevity, we write, e.g., p |α| = A |β| for |α| p and |β| p are both defined and p |α| p = A |β| p . Similarly, we write |α| p = |β| p if |α| p and |β| p are both defined and |α| p = |β| p .
We now extend the definition of equality to terms. Let α and β be closed p-terms of type A.
be a p-term of type B, and α and β be closed p-terms of type A. If p α = A β, then p γ(α) = B γ(β). In particular, it follows from (T3) that if |α| p = |β| p then p γ(α) = B γ(β). (T5) Let γ(x A ), δ(x A ) be p-terms of type B, and α, β be closed p-terms of type A. If p γ(α) = B δ(α) and p α = A β, then p γ(β) = B δ(β).
Proof of (T3).
If α is a constant of L of type A, then |α| p = |α| for all p. One can show that p |α| ∈ A for all p. If α is F A a , then p a ∈ A by definition, and so p F a ∈ A. Consider an application term αβ. Say α is of type A → B and β is of type A. We claim that p αβ ∈ B. Let q ⊇ p. By induction, we can find r ⊇ q such that r |α| ∈ A → B and r |β| ∈ A. Here we use monotonicity. By definition, there is s ⊇ r such that s |α| s r |β| r ∈ B. Since |αβ| s ≃ |α| s r |β| r , the claim follows.
Proof of (T4). If γ is x A then it is trivial. If γ is a constant see (T3). Let γ be an application term, say (γ 1 γ 2 )(x A ) of type C where γ i is of type A 1 = B → C and γ 2 is of type A 2 = B.
By induction we can find r ⊇ q such that r |γ i (α)| = A i |γ i (β)|. Note that here we use monotonicity. By definition, we can find s ⊇ r such that s |γ 1 
Proof of (T5). Suppose that p γ(α) = B δ(α) and p α = A β. By (T4), it follows that p γ(α) = B γ(β) and p δ(α) = B δ(β). By symmetry and transitivity, we get p γ(β) = B δ(β).
Remark. One can define, along the lines of Goodman, p α = A β iff |α| p and |β| p are both defined and p |α| p = A |β| p . Both definitions are fine, but we get slightly different properties. For instance, by our definition, if p α = A β then p γ(α) = B γ(β). This is property (T4). By this alternative definition, we only get that for some q ⊇ p, q γ(α) = B γ(β). This is however a minor issue.
(3) For every p ∈ T , for all numbers a, b and for every sentence ϕ of L p we define p (a, b) : ϕ. The meaning is that p forces a and b to be equal realizers of ϕ. Let p a : ϕ be a shorthand for p (a, a) : ϕ.
•
n ) Compare this definition with Goodman realizability. The atomic case is based on a different interpretation of equality: HRO in Goodman and HEO here. Indeed, one can recover Goodman realizability by reading p α = A β as |α| p = |β| p and p a = A b as a = b and p a ∈ A. On the other hand, one cannot recover our interpretation from Goodman realizability by simply replacing the atomic case. The treatment of equality between realizers is indeed the main feature of our interpretation.
By a : ϕ we mean that p a : ϕ for all p. In the proof of the soundness we use the following property to verify that a : ϕ.
Then a : ϕ.
Note that the following instances of (S) hold true ( 7 ).
(S1) Let ϕ be ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k ϕ. Say x i has type A i . Then (a, b) : ϕ iff for all n i , m i and for all p such that p n i = A i m i for i = 1, . . . , k, there is q ⊇ p such that q (an 1 . . . n k , bm 1 
• Proof. By induction on the proof of ϕ. The indices are the same as in Goodman [6, Theorem 1] . Say x i is of type A i . For the sake of brevity, we write A for A 1 , . . . , A k and x A for x 1 , . . . , x k . For the remainder of the proof we assume that the free variables of ϕ are among x A . We thus write a : ∀x A ϕ or simply a : ϕ for p a : ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k ϕ for every p ∈ T . To ease notation, we write, e.g., n for n 1 . . . n k so that a p n stands for a p n 1 . . . n k and p n = A m stands for p n 1 = A 1 m 1 , . . . , p n k = A k m k . Similarly, we write ϕ(F n ) for ϕ(F n 1 , . . . , F n k ).
We repeatedly use (S) and the fact that Kleene application and the forcing relation are monotone.
(1) a : ϕ → ϕ, where a p nb = b. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m and p (b, c) : ϕ(F n ), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (anb, amc) : ϕ(F n ). Easy. In fact, p (anb, amc) : ϕ(F n ).
(2) Modus ponens: if c : ϕ and b : ϕ → ψ then a : ψ. As in Goodman [6] we have to deal with variables, say x B , that might occur free in ϕ but are not among x A . Then the free variables of ϕ and ϕ → ψ are among x A , x B . By induction, let c : ∀x A ∀x B ϕ and b : ∀x A ∀x B (ϕ → ψ). Choose a such that a p n ≃ b p n0 B (c p n0 B ) , where p 0 B ∈ B for all p. We claim that a : ∀x A ψ.
Suppose p n = A m. By (S1), it suffices to show that there is q ⊇ p such that q (an, am) : ψ(F n ). Since p 0 B ∈ B, we can find q ⊇ p such that q (cn0 B , cm0 B ) : ϕ(F n , F 0 B ). Therefore there is r ⊇ q such that r (bn0 B (c r n0 B ), bm0 B (c r m0 B )) : ψ(F n ). Then r is as required.
(3) Syllogism: if c : ϕ → ψ and b : ψ → χ then a : ϕ → χ. 7 Actually, (S1) does not follow from (S) but the proof is similar.
As in (2) there might be variables, say x B , that are free in ψ but do not occur in x A . Let c : ∀x A ∀x B (ϕ → ψ) and b : ∀x A ∀x B (ψ → χ). Let 0 B be such that p 0 B ∈ B for all p. Choose a such that a p nd ≃ b p n0 B (c p n0 B d). We claim that a : ∀x A (ϕ → ψ).
Note that a p n is defined for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m and p (d, e) : ϕ(F n ), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (and, ame) :
First, note that the free variables of the premises are among x A . Note also that a p n is defined for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m and p (d, e) : χ(F n ), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (and, ame) : (ϕ ∧ ψ)(F n ). Easy. By induction, we can find q ⊇ p such that q (bnd, bme) : ϕ(F n ) and q (cnd, cme) : ψ(F n ). Then q ( bnd, cnd , bme, cme ) : (ϕ ∧ ψ)(F n ). So q is as desired. 
Note that a p n is defined for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m and p (d, e) : (ϕ ∨ ψ)(F n ), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (and, ame) : χ(F n ). Suppose (d) 0 = 0 = (e) 0 and p ((d) 1 , (e) 1 ) : ϕ(F n ). Then we can find q ⊇ p such that q (bn(d) 1 , bm(e) 1 ) : χ(F n ). But a q nd = b q n(d) 1 and a q me = b q m(e) 1 . Then q is as desired. The case (d) 0 = 1 = (e) 0 is similar.
For the first rule, note that a p nc is defined for all n, c, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m, p (c, d) : ϕ(F n ) and p (e, f ) : ψ(F n ), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (ance, amdf ) : χ(F n ). We have p ( c, e , d, f ) : (ϕ ∧ ψ)(F n ). By induction, there is q ⊇ p such that q (bn c, e , bm d, f ) : χ(F n ). Then q is as required.
The second rule is similar.
(9) a : 0 = S0 → ϕ, where a p nb = 0. Easy. Note that no p forces 0 = S0.
Suppose that x B is not among x A . Then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are among x A , x B . Let b : ∀x A ∀x B (ϕ → ψ). Choose a such that a p nce ≃ b p nec. We claim that a : ∀x A (ϕ → ∀x B ψ).
Note that a p nc is defined for all n, c, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p n = A m and p (c, d) : ϕ(F n ) then there is q ⊇ p such that q (anc, amd) : ∀x B ψ(F n ). We claim that p (anc, amd) : ∀x B ψ(F n ). Let q ⊇ p such that q e = B f . We aim to find r ⊇ q such that r (ance, amdf ) : ψ(F n , F e ). By induction, we can find r ⊇ q such that r (bnec, bmdf ) : ψ(F n , F e ). Then r is as required.
If x B is among x 1 , . . . , x k , say x B is x i , then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are also among x 1 , . . . , x k . Choose a such that a p nce ≃ b p n 1 . . . n i−1 en i+1 . . . n k c. Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
By (S), it is enough to show that if
If x B is among x 1 , . . . , x k , say x B is x i , then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are also among x 1 , . . . , x k . Choose a such that a p nc ≃ b p n 1 . . . n i−1 (c) 0 n i+1 . . . n k (c) 1 . Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
(12) a : ∀x B ϕ → ϕ(α) and a : ϕ(α) → ∃x B ϕ, for any term α free for x in ϕ, where a p nb ≃ b p (d p n) and a p nb ≃ d p n, b respectively, and d p n ≃ |α(F n )| p . The index d exists by (V2).
For the first axiom, it is sufficient to show by (S) that if p n = A m and p (b, c) :
, and thus r (anb, amc) : ϕ(F n , α(F n )). So r is as required.
For the second axiom, it is sufficient to show by (S) that if p n = A m and p (b, c) : ϕ(F n , α(F n )), then there is q ⊇ p such that q (anb, amc) : ∃x B ϕ(F n , x). By (T4), as p F n = A F m , we have that p α(F n ) = B α(F m ). Let q ⊇ p be such that q |α(F n )| = B |α(F m )|, that is, q dn = B dm. As q α(F n ) = B F dn , by (R2) we have that q (b, c) : ϕ(F n , F dn ) and so q (anb, amc) : ∃x B ϕ(F n , x). Choose a such that a p n = 0 for all n, p. It clearly suffices to prove that ( * ) if p n ∈ A then p α(F n ) = B β(F n ). The verification is routine. Consider for instance the axioms for the recursors.
(16) Rxy0 = B x and Rxy(Sz) = B y(Rxyz)z, for x of type B, y of type B → N → B and z of type N .
Note that ( * ) is equivalent to saying that for every p, if p n ∈ A, then there is q ⊇ p such that q |α(F n )| = B |β(F n )|.
We first claim that if p a ∈ B and p b ∈ B → N → B, then for all i there exists q ⊇ p such that q |RF a F b F i | ∈ B. Let i = 0. Then |RF a F b F 0 | p ≃ |R| p ab0. By definition, |R| p ab0 = a, and so p is as desired. Case i + 1. Let q ⊇ p such that q |RF a F b F i | ∈ B. By assumption, we can find r ⊇ q such that r b(|RF a F b F i | q )i ∈ B. On the other hand, |RF a F b F i+1 | q ≃ b q (|R| q abi)i. It follows that r is as desired.
For the first axiom, suppose that x A is x, y, . . . Let p n ∈ A. In particular, p n 1 ∈ B. We claim that p RF n 1 F n 2 0 = B F n 1 . By definition, |R| p n 1 n 2 0 = n 1 . On the other hand, |RF n 1 F n 2 0| p ≃ |R| p n 1 n 2 0. By (T3), it follows that p is as desired.
For the second axiom, suppose that x A is x, y, z, . . . Let p n = A m. In particular, p n 1 ∈ A and p n 2 ∈ B → N → B. By the claim, there is q ⊇ p such that q |RF n 1 F n 2 F n 3 | ∈ B. By the assumption on b, we can find r ⊇ q such that r n 2 (|RF n 1 F n 2 F n 3 | q n 3 ∈ B. It is not difficult to check by using the definition of |R| that |RF n 1 F n 2 (SF n 3 )| r = |F n 2 (RF n 1 F n 2 F n 3 )F n 3 | r . It follows by (T3) that r is as desired.
(19) Induction: If b : ϕ(0) and c : ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx) then a : ϕ(x), for x of type N , where a p n0 ≃ b p n and a p n(i + 1) ≃ c p ni(a p ni).
We may assume that x A is x B , x N . Let b : ∀x B ϕ(0) and c : ∀x B ∀x N (ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx)). We claim that a : ∀x B ∀x N ϕ(x).
By (S1), it is enough to show that for all n, m, i, p, if p n = B m then there is q ⊇ p such that q (ani, ami) : ϕ(F B n , F N i ). By induction on i. Let i = 0. Fix n, m, p such that p n = B m. Then there is q ⊇ p such that q (bn, bm) : ϕ(F n , 0). By (R2), q (bn, bm) : ϕ(F n , F 0 ). Thus q (an0, am0) : ϕ(F n , F 0 ). Suppose this is true for i and let p n = B m. By induction, there is q ⊇ p such that q (ani, ami) : ϕ(F n , F i ). By definition, we can find r ⊇ q such that r (cni(ani), cmi(ami)) : ϕ(F n , SF i ). Since |SF i | r = i + 1, by (R2) we have that r (cni(ani), cmi(ami)) : ϕ(F n , F i+1 ), and therefore r (an(i + 1), am(i + 1)) : ϕ(F n , F i+1 ), as desired.
(20) a : x = x for x of type A, where a p n = 0. Easy.
(21) a : x = y ∨ ¬(x = y) for x and y of type N . We may assume that x A is x, y, . . . Choose a such that a p n 1 n 2 . . . n k = 0, 0 if n 1 = n 2 , 1, 0 otherwise. Easy.
(22) Leibniz: a : x B = y B ∧ ϕ(x) → ϕ(y), for x and y of type B, where a p nb = (b) 1 . We may assume that x A is x, y . . . Let p n = A m and p (b, c) :
By (R2) the claim follows.
(23) Extensionality: a : ∀z B (xz = C yz) → x = B→C y, where a p nb = 0. In this case A is B → C. We may assume that x A is x, y, . . . Suppose p n = A m and p (b, c) : ∀z B (F n 1 z = C F n 2 z). By (S), it suffices to show that p (anb, amc) : F n 1 = B→C F n 2 , that is, p F n 1 = B→C F n 2 . As |F n i | p = n i , it is enough to show that p n 1 = B→C n 2 . Note that p n 1 , n 2 ∈ B → C. By (E3), we just need to show that if q ⊇ p and q d ∈ B then there is r ⊇ q such that r n 1 d = C n 2 d. Let q d ∈ B. As q (b, c) : ∀z B (F n 1 z = F n 2 z), we can find r ⊇ q such that r (bd, cd) : 
For (i), let q ⊇ p and suppose that q d = B e. As q (b, c) : ∀x B ∃y C ϕ(F n , x, y), we can find r ⊇ q such that r (bd, ce) : ∃y C ϕ(F n , F d , y). In particular, r (bd) 0 = C (ce) 0 , and so r a 0 nbd = C a 0 mce, as desired. This proves (i).
For (ii), let q ⊇ p and suppose that q d = B e. Since q (b, c) : ∀x B ∃y C ϕ(F n , x, y), we can find
The claim follows. By (S), a is as desired.
(25) Axiom of relativized dependent choice:
For ease of presentation, we assume that x A is empty. Let a p bnd ≃ f p bnd, 0, g p bnd , where
and h is such that h p bnd0 = n, d, 0 and
We claim that a is as desired. Note tha a p bnd is defined for all b, n, d, p. We use (S). Suppose p (b, c) : ∀x B [ϕ(x) → ∃y B (ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], p n = B m and p (d, e) : ϕ(F n ). We claim that p (abnd, acme) : ∃z N →B (z0 = F n ∧ ∀v N ψ(zv, z(Sv)). Note that (a p bnd) 1 = 0 = (acme) 1 . It is thus sufficient to show that:
, and f p nd0 = n, we have by (T4) that p F f bnd 0 = B F n , and so (i) holds. It remains to show (ii) and (iii). To this end, we claim that for all q ⊇ p and for all i there is r ⊇ q such that r f bndi = B f cmei and r ((hbndi) 10 , (hcmei) 10 ) : ϕ(F f bndi ). By induction on i. Let i = 0 and q ⊇ p. It is easy to see that q is as desired. In fact, by monotonicity, q n = B m and q (d, e) : ϕ(F n ). On the other hand, we have that f q bnd0 = n, f q cme0 = m, (h q bnd0) 10 = d and (h q cme0) 10 = e. This proves i = 0. Suppose this is true for i. Let us prove that claim for i + 1. Let q ⊇ p. By induction, let r ⊇ q satisfy the claim for i. As r (b, c) : ∀x B [ϕ(x) → ∃y B (ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], it follows from the definition of h that there is s ⊇ r such that s (hbnd(i + 1), hcme(i + 1)) : ∃y B (ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(F f bndi , y)), and so s is as required. This proves the claim.
Clearly, (ii) follows directly from the claim. For (iii), let q ⊇ p and i be given. We aim to show that there is r ⊇ q such that r (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(F f bnd F i , F f bnd (SF i )). By the claim, we can find r ⊇ q such that r f bndi = B f cmei and r ((hbndi) 10 , (hcmei) 10 ) : ϕ(F f bndi ). As r (b, c) : ∀x B [ϕ(x) → ∃y B (ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], it follows from the definition of h that there is s ⊇ r such that s (hbnd(i+1), hcme(i+1)) : ∃y B (ϕ(y)∧ψ(F f bndi , y)), and so s (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(F f bndi , F f bnd(i+1) ).
As usual, by (R2), we have that s (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(F f bnd F i , F f bnd (SF i )), and hence s is as required. This completes the proof of (iii). • If ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ) is true, then for all p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p such that q an 1 . . . n k : ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k )
• If p (b, c) : ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ), then ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ) is true.
In particular, if ϕ is a first-order sentence, then there exists a nonempty set T of finite partial functions such that:
• if ϕ is true, then for every p ∈ T there exist q ⊇ p and an index a such that q a : ϕ
Proof. Let ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ l be an enumeration of all subformulas of ϕ. After renaming of bound variables, if necessary, we can choose distinct variables
listing all of the free variables of ϕ j so that if ϕ j is ψ • χ then x j are the variables for both ψ and χ and if ϕ j is Qxψ then x j , x are the variables for ψ. We can safely assume that x 1 , . . . , x k are the variables for ϕ Let T be the set of all finite functions p such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l} and for all j, n 1 , . . . , n k j ∈ dom(p), if ϕ j is of the form ψ 0 ∨ ψ 1 then either p( j, n 1 , . . . , n k j ) = 0 and ψ 0 (n 1 , . . . ,n k j ) is true, or p( j, n 1 , . . . , n k j ) = 1 and ψ 1 (n 1 , . . . ,n k j ) is true, and if ϕ j is of the form ∃xψ, then ψ(n 1 , . . . ,n k j ,m) is true, where m = p( j, n 1 , . . . n k j ).
By induction on every subformula ψ of ϕ, we prove that every ϕ j has an index a with respect to variables x j .
For the sake of brevity we write n for n 1 . . . n k j . Similarly, we write ψ(n) for ψ(n 1 , . . . ,n k j ) and p(j, n) for p( j, n 1 , . . . , n k j ).
(1) Suppose ψ is α = N β. Let a p n = 0 for all p, n. For every first-order closed term α there exists a number |α| such that |α| p = |α| for all p. Indeed, |α| is the interpretation of α in the standard model. Therefore, for any first-order closed terms α and β, α = β is true iff |α| = |β|. We thus have that ψ(n) is true iff |α(n)| = |β(n)|. On the other hand, p (b, c) : ψ(n) iff p ψ(n) iff |α(n)| = |β(n)|. This proves (1).
(2) Suppose ψ is ψ 0 ∧ ψ 1 . Let a p n ≃ a p 0 n, a p 1 n , where a i are indices for ψ i . Suppose ψ(n) is true and p ∈ T . Then ψ i (n) is true for every i < 2. By induction, we can find q ⊇ p such that q a q i n : ψ i (n). Then q an : ψ(n). If p (b, c) : ψ(n), then by induction ψ 0 (n) and ψ 1 (n) are both true, and so is ψ(n).
(3) Suppose ψ = ϕ j is ψ 0 ∨ ψ 1 . Let a i be an index for ψ i . Choose a such that for all n and for all p ∈ T ,
Suppose ψ(n) is true and p ∈ T . If p(j, n) is defined, say p(j, n) = 0, then ψ 0 (n) is true and by induction there is q ⊇ p such that q a 0 n : ψ 0 (n). Then a q n = 0, a q 0 n and q an : ψ(n). Suppose p(j, n) is undefined. Since ψ(n) is true, either ψ 0 (n) is true or ψ 1 (n) is true. Say ψ 1 (n) is true. Let q ⊇ p be such that q(j, n) = 1. Then q ∈ T . By induction, there exists r ⊇ q such that r a 1 n : ψ 1 (n). As before, r an : ψ(n).
If p (b, c) : ψ(n), then by induction either ψ 0 (n) is true or ψ 1 (n) is true, and so is ψ(n).
1 n, where a 1 is an index for ψ 1 . Suppose ψ(n) is true. Let p ∈ T . Note that a p n is defined. We claim that p an : ψ(n). Let q ⊇ p and suppose that q (b, c) : ψ 0 (n). By induction, ψ 0 (n) is true and so is ψ 1 (n). By induction there is r ⊇ q such that r a 1 n : ψ 1 (n). Then r (anb, anc) : ψ 1 (n).
Suppose p (b, c) : ψ(n). Let us show that ψ(n) is true. Suppose ψ 0 (n) is true. We aim to show that ψ 1 (n) is true. By induction, there is q ⊇ p such that q a 0 n : ψ 0 (n). By definition, there is r ⊇ q such that, e.g, r ba 0 n : ψ 1 (n). By induction, ψ 1 (n) is true, as desired.
(5) Suppose ψ = ϕ j is ∃xψ 0 . Let a p n ≃ p(j, n), a p 0 np(j, n) . Suppose ψ(n) is true and let p ∈ T . If p(j, n) is defined, then ψ 0 (n,m), where m = p(j, n), is true. By induction there is q ⊇ p such that q a 0 nm : ψ 0 (n,m). By (R3), as |m| p = |F N m | p , we have q a 0 nm : ψ 0 (n, F m ) and hence q an : ψ(n). If p(j, n) is not defined, let m be such that ψ 0 (n,m) is true. Such m exists by hypothesis. Extend p to a function q such that q(j, n) = m. Then q ∈ T . By induction there is r ⊇ q such that r a 0 nm : ψ 0 (n,m). As before, r an : ψ(n).
If
. By induction ψ 0 (n,m) is true and so is ψ(n).
(6) Suppose
Suppose ψ(n) is true. Let p ∈ T . We claim that p an : ψ(n). We just need to show that for all m and for all q ⊇ p there is r ⊇ q such that r anm : ψ(m, F N m ). Let m, q be given. Since ψ(n) is true, so is ψ 0 (n,m). By induction, there is r ⊇ q such that r a 0 nm : ψ 0 (n,m). The claim follows as in (5) .
Finally, suppose p (b, c) : ψ(n). Let m be given. By definition, there is q ⊇ p such that q (bn, cm) : ψ(n, F m ). Since |F m | q = m = |m| q , we thus have that q (bn, cm) : ψ(n,m). By induction, ψ(n,m) is true. This shows that ψ(n) is true.
Formalizing the above proofs in HA, we obtain Goodman's theorem for E-HA ω + AC + DC.
Theorem 4.3. E-HA ω + AC + DC is conservative over HA.
Realizing choice and extensionality
We provide a realizability interpretation a : ϕ such that for every sentence ϕ of L, if
then there exists an index a such that HA ⊢ a : ϕ. The idea is to combine HEO with a version of Kleene recursive realizability whose realizers are elements of HEO.
E-HA ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ HEO + Kleene − −−−−−−−− → HA ⊢ a : ϕ One can also define a realizability notion that combines Kreisel's modified realizability with the HEO interpretation. This way also independence of premise for ∃-free formulas [7, Section 5.1] is realizable. Warning: we write a : ϕ for ease of notation, although the meaning is different from Section 4.
As before, the discussion is informal. The reader will convince himself that all the definitions and proofs can be carried out in HA.
Convention. We write, e.g., ab = A cd for ab and cd are defined and ab = A cd. Similarly for ab ∈ A and ab : ϕ.
(1) For numbers a, b and type A, we define a = A b such that (A, = A ) is a model of E-HA ω , where a ∈ A means a = A a. By recursion on A.
• (2) Let L * be the language L of HA ω plus a constant F A a of type A for every a ∈ A. We simply write F a when the type is clear from the context. Let us define the value |α| of a closed term α of L * by recursion on α:
• |0| = 0 • |S| = Λn.n + 1 is any index for the function λn.n + 1. 
For α and β closed terms of type A, we define α = A β iff |α| = A |β|. In particular, α ∈ A iff |α| ∈ A.
Properties. (T1) For every closed term α of type A, α ∈ A (easy induction on α). (T2) If γ(x A ) is a term of type B, α and β are closed terms of type A, and α = A β, then γ(α) = B γ(β). In particular, if |α| = |β| then γ(α) = B γ(β).
(3) Type of a formula. We define the type of a formula ϕ of L * as follows. The type of an atomic formula is N . Suppose ϕ has type A and ψ has type B. Then the type of ϕ ∧ ψ and ∃x A ψ(x) is A × B. The type of ϕ ∨ ψ is N × A × B. The type of ϕ → ψ and ∀x A ψ(x) is A → B. Note that if ϕ(x) has type A, so does ϕ(α). If ϕ has type A, we write ϕ A .
(4) Realizability. For a number a and a sentence ϕ of L * we define a : ϕ by recursion on ϕ: ).
• a : ∀x A ϕ B (x) iff a ∈ A → B and if n ∈ A then an : ϕ(F A n ), The clause for ∨ bears similarity with Kreisel's modified realizability. One could introduce disjoint types to deal with ∨. We prefer this solution.
Properties. (R1) a : ϕ A implies a ∈ A (by induction on ϕ). (R2) If α = A β and a : ϕ(α), then a : ϕ(β).
Proof of (R2).
By induction on ϕ. For the atomic case we have to show that if α = A β and γ(α) = B δ(α) then γ(β) = B δ(β). It follows from (T2) and the transitivity of = B . The inductive cases are straightforward.
In the proof of the soundness we use the following property to verify that a : ϕ. (S) Let ϕ be ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k (ϕ 1 → . . . → ϕ l+1 ) . Say x i has type A i and ϕ i has type B i .
• Suppose a : ϕ.
. . c l and
Then a : ϕ. Also consider the following instances of (S). (S1) Let ϕ be ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k ϕ. Say x i has type A i and ϕ has type B. Then a : ϕ iff for all n i , m i such that n i = A i m i for i = 1, . . . , k, we have that an 1 . . . n k = B am 1 . . . m k and an 1 . . . n k : ϕ(F n 1 , . . . , F n k ).
(S2) Let ϕ be ϕ 1 → . . . → ϕ l → ϕ l+1 . Say ϕ i has type B i .
• Proof. The indices are mostly the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Only the indices for axioms and rules involving ∨, that is, (5), (7), and (21), are slightly different. The bulk of the proof is to check that the indices have the right type. The verification is routine. For the sake of completeness, we write down the details. Assume x i is of type A i . For the sake of brevity, we write A for A 1 , . . . , A k and x A for x 1 , . . . , x k . For the remainder of the proof we assume that the free variables of ϕ are among x A . We thus write a : ∀x A ϕ or simply a : ϕ for a : ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k ϕ. We write, e.g., n for n 1 . . . n k so that an stands for an 1 . . . n k and n = A m stands for
We repeatedly use (S) to show that a : ϕ.
(1) a : ϕ B → ϕ B , where anb = b. It is easy to see that a ∈ A → B → B is an index for ϕ → ϕ. ≃ bn0 B (cn0 B d) . We claim that a ∈ A → C → E is as desired.
By (S), it is enough show that if n = A m, d = C e and d : ϕ(F n ) then and = E ame and and : χ(F n ). By induction, cn0 B d = D cm0 B e and cn0 B d : ψ(F n ). On the other hand, bn0 B = D→E bm0 B and bn0 B : (ψ → χ)(F n ). It thus follows that bn0 B (cn0 B d) = E bm0 B (cm0 B e), that is, and = E ame, and bn0 B (cn0 B d) : χ(F n ), that is, and : χ(F n ). Since an is defined for all n, it is enough to show by (S) that if n = A m, d = B e and d : χ(F n ) then and = C×D ame and and : (ϕ∧ψ)(F n ). This is straightforward.
We claim that a ∈ A → N × B × C → D is as desired. Note that an is defined for all n. 
, that is, and = D ame, and bn(d) 1 : χ(F n ), that is, and : χ(F n ), as desired.
For the first rule, let us show that a ∈ A → B → C → D is as desired. Note tha anc is defined for all n, c. By (S), it suffices to show that if n = A m, c = B d with c : ϕ(F n ), and e = C f with e : ψ(F n ), then ance = D amdf and ance : χ(F n ). Straightforward.
The second rule is similar. Note that anc is defined for all n, c. By (S), it is enough to show that is n = A m, c = C d and c : ϕ(F n ), then anc = B→D amd and anc : ∀xψ(F n , x). Suppose e = B f . We aim to show that ance = D amdf and ance : ψ(F n , F e ). By induction, bnec = D bmf d and bnec : ψ(F n , F e ). By definition, a is as required.
If x B is among x 1 , . . . , x k , say x B is x i , then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are also among x 1 , . . . , x k . Choose a such that ance ≃ bn 1 . . . n i−1 en i+1 . . . n k c. Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
Suppose that x B is not among x A . Then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are among x A , x B . By induction, let b ∈ A → B → C → D be an index for ϕ → ψ. Choose a such that anc ≃ bn(c) 0 (c) 1 . We claim that a ∈ A → B × C → D is as desired.
By (S), it is enough to show that if n = A m, c = B×C d and c : ∃x B ϕ(F n , x), then anc = D amd and anc : ψ(F n ). By assumption, (c)
If x B is among x 1 , . . . , x k , say x B is x i , then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are also among x 1 , . . . , x k . Choose a such that anc ≃ bn 1 , . . . , n i−1 , (c) 0 , n i+1 , . . . , n k (c) 1 ). Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
(12) a : ∀x B ϕ C → ϕ C (α) and a : ϕ C (α) → ∃x B ϕ C , for any term α free for x B in ϕ, where anb ≃ b(dn) and anb ≃ dn, b respectively, and dn ≃ |α(F n )|. The index d exists by (V2).
Let us check that a ∈ A → (B → C) → C is an index for the first axiom. By (S), it suffices to show that if n = A m, b = B→C c and b : ∀x B ϕ(F n , x), then anb = C amc and anb : ϕ(F n , α(F n )). By assumption, F n = A F m and hence by (T2) we have that α(F n ) = B α(F m ), that is, dn = B dm. By the assumption on b, it follows that b(dn) C b(dm) and b(dn) : ϕ(F n , F dn ). As F dn = B α(F n ), by (R2) we have that b(dn) : ϕ(F n , α(F n )). By definition, a is as required.
For the second axiom, let us check that a ∈ A → C → B × C is as desired. By (S), it suffices to show that if n = A m, b = C c and b : ϕ(F n , α(F n )), then anb = B×C amc and anb : ∃x B ϕ(F n , x), that is, dn = B dm, b = C c, dn ∈ B and b : ϕ(F n , F dn ). It is clearly enough to prove that dn = B dm and b : ϕ(F n , F dn ). As before, α(F n ) = B α(F m ), that is, dn = B dm. Also, α(F n ) = B F dn , and hence by (R2) it follows that b : ϕ(F n , F dn ), as required.
(13) a : ¬(0 = Sx) and a : Sx = Sy → x = y, for x, y variables of type N , where anb = 0. Easy.
All the axioms from (14) to (18) are given by atomic formulas (type N ). Choose a such that an = 0 for all n. It is routine to check that a ∈ A → N is as required.
(19) Induction: If b : ϕ C (0) and c : vp C (x) → ϕ C (Sx) then a : ϕ C (x), for x of type N , where an0 ≃ bn and an(i + 1) ≃ cni(ani).
We may assume that x A is x B , x N . By induction, let b ∈ B → C be an index for ϕ(0) and c ∈ A → C → C be an index for ϕ(x) → ϕ(x + 1). We claim that a ∈ A → C is an index for ϕ(x).
By (S1), it is enough to show that for all n, m, i, if n = B m then ani = C ami and ani : ϕ(F n , F i ). By induction on i. Let i = 0. By induction, bn = C bm and bn : ϕ(F n , 0). By (R2), bn : ϕ(F n , F 0 ). Since an0 = bn and am0 = bm, we are done. Suppose this is true for i and let us prove the claim for i + 1. By the assumption, cni = C→C cmi and cni : ϕ(F n , F i ) → ϕ(F n , SF i ). It follows from the induction hypothesis that cni(ani) = C cmi(ami) and cni(ani) : ϕ(F n , SF i ). By (R2), cni(ani) : ϕ(F n , F i+1 ). The claim follows from the definition of a.
(20) a : x = x for x of type A, where an = 0. Then a ∈ A → N is an index for x = x. Easy.
(21) a : x = y ∨ ¬(x = y) for x of type N . We may assume that x A is x, y, . . . Choose a such that an = 0, 0, b if n 1 = n 2 , and an = 1, 0, b otherwise, where bc = 0 for all c. Let us show that
By (S), it is sufficient to show that if n = A m then an = B am and an :
. Here we use the fact that equality between natural numbers is decidable. Suppose n 1 = n 2 . As n = A m, we have that m 1 = m 2 and so an = 0, 0, b = am. It follows that an = B am. On the other hand, 0 : F n 1 = F n 2 , and therefore an is as desired. Suppose n 1 = n 2 . As n = A m, it follows that m 1 = m 2 and so an = 1, 0, b = am. As before, an = B am. It remains to show that an is a realizer, that is, b : ¬(F n 1 = F n 2 ). Since b ∈ N → N , it is sufficient to show that if c : F n 1 = F n 2 then bc : 0 = S0. Since c : F n 1 = F n 2 iff n 1 = n 2 , the conclusion follows from ex falso.
We may assume that x A is x, y, . . . Let us show that a ∈ A → N × C → C is as desired. Let n = A m, b = N ×C c and b : F n 1 = B F n 2 ∧ ϕ(F n ). By (S), we aim to show that anb = C amc and anb : ϕ(F n 2 , F n 2 , . . . , F n k ). The first part is straightforward. For the second part, we have by the assumption that (b) 0 : F n 1 = B F n 2 , that is, n 1 = B n 2 , and (b) 1 : ϕ(F n ). Then anb : ϕ(F n ). The conclusion follows from (R2).
(23) Extensionality: a : ∀z B (xz = C yz) → x = B→C y, where anb = 0. We may assume that x A is x, y, . . . Let us check that a ∈ A → (B → N ) → N is as desired. Suppose n = A m, b = B→N c and b : ∀z B (F n 1 z = C F n 2 z). By (S), it is sufficient to show that anb = amc and anb : F n 1 = B→C F n 2 , that is n 1 = B→C n 2 . The first part is trivial, since anb = 0 = amc. For the second part, note that n 1 , n 2 ∈ B → C. By (E2), it is sufficient to show that if d ∈ B then
(24) Axiom of choice: a : ∀x B ∃y C 0 ϕ C 1 (x, y) → ∃z B→C 0 ∀x B ϕ C 1 (x, zx), where anb = a 0 nb, a 1 nb , and a i nbd ≃ (bd) i . We claim that
E is as desired. Note that anb is defined everywhere. Let n = A m, b = D c and b : ∀x∃yϕ(F n , x, y). By (S), it is sufficient to show (i) anb = E amc, that is, a i nb = B→C i a i mc for i < 2, and (ii) anb : ∃z∀xϕ(F n , x, zx).
Let us prove (i). Let d = B e. From b = D c we have that bd = C 0 ×C 1 ce, and so (bd) i = C i (ce) i . By the definition of a i , we thus have a i nbd = C i a i mce. To prove (ii), since a 0 nb ∈ B → C 0 by (i), it is enough to show that a 1 nb : ∀xϕ(F n , x, F a 0 nb x). Similarly, since a 1 nb ∈ B → C 1 by (i), it is enough to show that for all d ∈ B, a 1 nbd : ϕ(F n , F d , F a 0 nb F d ). As b : ∀x B ∃y C 0 ϕ C 1 (F n , x, y), we have that (bd) 1 : ϕ(F n , F d , F (bd) 0 ). Now, a 1 nbd = (bd) 1 and |F a 0 nb F d | = a 0 nbd = (bd) 0 = |F (bd) 0 |. It follows from (T2) and (R2) that a 1 nbd is as required.
For simplicity, suppose that x A is empty. Let abnd ≃ f bnd, 0, gbnd , where f bndi ≃ (hbndi) 0 , gbndi ≃ (hbnd(i + 1)) 2 , and h is such that hbnd0 = n, d, 0 and hbnd(i + 1) ≃ b(hbndi) 0 (hbndi) 1 Clearly, (ii) follows from (a). Finally, let us prove (iii), that is, for all i, gbndi = D gcmei and gbndi : ψ(F f bnd F i , F f bnd (SF i )). Let i be given. As in the proof of the claim, we have that hbnd(i + 1) = B×C×D hcme(i + 1) and hbnd(i + 1) : ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(F f bndi , y)). By the definition of g, we thus have that gbndi = D gcmei, as desired, and gbndi : ψ(F f bndi , F f bnd(i+1) ). By (R2), it follows that gbndi : ψ(F f bnd F i , F f bnd (SF i )).
We can formalize the above proof in HA. We thus obtain: Theorem 5.2. Let ϕ be a sentence of L. If E-HA ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ then there is an index a such that HA ⊢ a : ϕ.
5.1. Remarks. One can define a Goodman version p a : ϕ of this realizability notion. For instance, the clause for implication would be • p a : ϕ A → ψ B iff p a ∈ A → B and for all q ⊇ p and for all b, if q b : ϕ A then there is r ⊇ q such that r ab : ψ B . This interpretation is sound, that is, for every sentence ϕ provable in E-HA ω + AC + DC and for every definable set T of partial functions there is an index a such that HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T p a : ϕ. However, the self-realizability theorem fails in HA. Let us see what goes wrong.
Suppose we want to prove that for every first-order formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) of type B there exist a set T of finite functions and an index a such that:
(i) For all n and for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that q an ∈ B.
(ii) If ϕ(n) is true, then for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that q an : ϕ(n) (iii) If p b : ϕ(n) then ϕ(n) is true, where n = n 1 . . . n k and ϕ(n) is ϕ(n 1 , . . . ,n k ). Choose T as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof goes smoothly except for ∨ and ∃. In fact, we need classical logic to prove (i), and so we cannot formalize the proof in HA. Note however that the argument can be carried out in PA. In more detail, consider ψ j = ψ 0 ∨ ψ 1 , with ψ i of type B i . Suppose a i works for ψ i . Let Fix n, p. By induction we can find q ⊇ p such that a i q n is defined for every i < 2. However we cannot prove that there is an extension of q in T which is defined on j, n. In fact, we should be able to decide whether ψ 0 (n) ∨ ψ 1 (n) is true. Similarly, if ψ = ∃xψ 0 and a is as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, then we cannot prove that for all n and p there is q ⊇ p such that a q n is defined. In fact, as before, we should be able to decide whether ∃xψ 0 (n) is true.
Note
After submitting the paper, the author was informed by Fernando Ferreira of a recent work by Benno van den Berg and Lotte van Slooten [10] on Goodman's theorem. Combining different ideas from previous proofs, in particular Lavalette [4] , they give another proof of Goodman's theorem and its extensional version. To do so, they define the system HAP, a variant of Beeson's EON (Elementary theory of Operations and Numbers) and Troelstra's APP, which is a conservative extension of HA based on the logic of partial terms introduced by Beeson [2] . They then show that (1) if HA ω + AC ⊢ ϕ then HAP ⊢ ∃x(x r ϕ), where x r ϕ is a realizability interpretation of formulas ϕ of HA ω into formulas of HAP which combines Kleene recursive realizability with the model HRO. They finally show that for a conservative extension HAP ε of HAP, obtained from HAP by adding Skolemization axioms of the form ∃yϕ(x, y) → f ϕ · x ↓ and f ϕ · x → ϕ(x, f · x) for every arithmetical formula of HAP, one proves that (2) HAP ε ⊢ ϕ ↔ ∃x(x r ϕ) for every arithmetical formula ϕ. Putting the pieces together one obtains for every arithmetical formula ϕ HA ω + AC ⊢ ϕ ⇒ HAP ⊢ ∃x(x r ϕ) ⇒ HAP ε ⊢ ϕ ⇒ HA ⊢ ϕ It is worth noticing that the conservativity proof of HAP ε over HAP is based on a forcing interpretation p ϕ of formulas ϕ of HAP ε that resembles our forcing relation and that the proof of (2) is similar to the proof of the self-realizability theorem. For E-HA ω + AC they define an extensional version x = y e ϕ of Kleene recursive realizability combined with the model HEO, and they prove corresponding (1) and (2) . This notion resembles our (a, b) : ϕ.
